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Abstract
The democratic accountability of policymaking institutions which are auto-
nomous within delegated mandates has not received as much attention as their
independence. We analyze in a theoretical model the eﬀects of accountability in
the form of possible overriding of economic policy decisions by the government un-
der diﬀerent degrees of independence of expert committees conducting monetary
and ﬁscal policy. The equilibrium outcomes of such alternative institution-design
frameworks are compared according to key macroeconomic performance criteria.
Our results stress the trade-oﬀ between anchoring inﬂation expectations on target
and output stabilization that is not solved with accountability.
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1M o t i v a t i o n
The purpose of this paper is to address analytically a central question in institution design
that has direct implications for policymaking: How are diﬀerent degrees of independence
of monetary and ﬁscal policies aﬀected in inﬂuencing macroeconomic outcomes when
complemented with accountability? Whereas the issue of the autonomy of monetary
policy has been investigated at length, ﬁscal policy independence from the government
has hardly been studied at all. This is not least because of the distributive eﬀects of
ﬁscal policy which call for ex ante democratic control. However, as Wyplosz (2005)
argues, the determination of the ﬁscal deﬁcit can also be delegated to an independent
agency, since it does not diﬀer much in its distributive eﬀects from the determination of
the interest rate by monetary policy. Formalizing these ideas, our contribution here is to
set up and solve a macroeconomic game-theoretic model where ﬁscal policy — or, more
precisely, its stabilization role — can be delegated to an expert committee in the same way
as monetary policy. Policy delegation in a democracy implies accountability, the more
so under publicly announced targets as is common nowadays. Insofar accountability has
not been well deﬁned and explored either in the related literature, our model constitutes
as well an attempt to operationalize this concept in a straightforward way in order to
analyze its macroeconomic eﬀects.
In addition to the main theoretical motivation expounded further down (subsection
1.2), our interest in the topic is justiﬁed from the perspectives of both empirical obser-
vation and policy application (subsection 1.1).
1 . 1 E m p i r i c a lF a c t sa sP o l i c yO u t c o m e s ?
Empirically, several stylized facts have persisted since the early 1990s. Figure 1 shows
that inﬂation has been low and stable in the OECD countries and the Euro area. Un-
employment rates have been decreasing too, except in Germany, but with some cyclical
pattern. There is an ongoing discussion to what extent this ‘great moderation’ should
be attributed to ‘good policy’ or to ‘good luck’ or to both. However, a deeper scrutiny
of the data quickly excludes ﬁscal policy from having been ‘good’, in the sense of time
consistent and, hence, credible, even if the convergence to explicit or implicit inﬂation
targeting institutional frameworks has at the same time ensured greater dynamic con-
sistency and credibility of monetary policy. Figure 2 provides evidence on a persistent
‘deﬁcit bias’, even when the cyclically adjusted general government budget balance is
taken into account.
[ Figures 1 and 2 about here ]2 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
Clearly, the economic environment has been the same for monetary and ﬁscal policy
during the time period in the ﬁgures, but the respective institutions and mechanisms
implementing them have diﬀered much. This institution-design aspect may explain why
monetary policy has been much more successful than ﬁs c a lp o l i c y ,a si sc u r r e n t l yw i d e l y
believed. Since the early 1990s monetary policy in the OECD and Euro area countries
has been operating under considerable autonomy, yet mostly within credible monetary
regimes imposing some form of constrained discretion. Monetary policy committees,
legally assigned clear mandates and operationally involving independent expertise to a
substantial degree, have been at the core of responsible decision making. Fiscal policy, by
contrast has been implemented by elected governments, often within the leeway of pre-
scribed ﬁscal rules, for instance, the Stability and Growth Pact. There is also agreement
among researchers that ﬁscal policy has in eﬀect remained unconstrained by such ﬁscal
rules, basically because they have been easily breached (as Figure 2 also illustrates).
1.2 Theoretical Analysis of Institution Design
Wyplosz (2005) has notably insisted that institution design, not mechanistic rules, is
needed to overcome the ‘time inconsistency that plagues ﬁscal policy’. The particular
novelty of our approach is that we set to explore alternative social arrangements which
delegate to independent but accountable non-elected expert committees both monetary
and ﬁscal policy. Such institutional mechanisms are theoretically appealing because of
their potential to enhance policy credibility and eﬀectiveness compared to the situation
where elected ﬁscal authorities and governments induce the well-known problems of dy-
namic inconsistency and political business cycles. More precisely, in a way symmetric to
an appointed independent but accountable Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) imple-
menting its mandate, we incorporate an analogous independent but accountable Fiscal
Policy Committee (FPC), with a corresponding mandate in the ﬁscal policy area. Our
model builds upon the existing literature that derives optimal policy instruments, both
in the tradition of Kydland-Prescott (1977) — Barro-Gordon (1982 a, b) and following its
modern New Keynesian extensions.
We motivate three goals to achieve at a social level, an output, an inﬂation and a pub-
lic deﬁcit-to-GDP target, and assume two instruments at disposal, the interest rate to
conduct monetary policy and the general government (primary) budget deﬁcit-to-GDP
to conduct ﬁscal policy. Each implementing authority is assigned or chooses a target,
and actions are potentially, but not necessarily, coordinated. We then consider alterna-
tive institutional frameworks for macroeconomic policymaking, which embody particular
social choices of institution design (i.e., the preferences of a given society) spanning diﬀer-
ent degrees of independence without or with accountability of the expert committees toIndependence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 3
the government. Accountability is modeled as an override clause which the government
may implement, e.g., under extreme shocks in the spirit of Lohmann (1992) and Blinder
(1997). Independence and accountability are, thus, both deﬁned with respect to the gov-
ernment.1 Society, via parliament, ‘institutionalizes’ its preferences by granting certain
degrees of independence — without or with an override option for the government — to
the monetary and/or ﬁscal authority, both ‘conservative’ in the sense of Rogoﬀ (1985).
The government, being the elected representative of the principal, implements the policy
regime chosen by society, while the committees, as agents, are accountable within their
m a n d a t ef o rt h ed e g r e eo ff r e e d o me a c hi sa l l o w e di nc o n d u c t i n gt h er e s p e c t i v ep o l i c i e s .
Our conceptual and modeling approach also follows recent reﬁnements and applications
of the mentioned classical articles.2
The huge theoretical and empirical literature on optimal monetary policy and its del-
egation3 has established that a more autonomous central bank tends to lead to a lower
actual inﬂa t i o no na v e r a g e .E i j ﬃnger and Hoeberichts (2002) have emphasized that such
a democratic approach to the conduct of monetary policy would require augmented re-
sponsibility of the central bank for its actions as well as accountability to the government
and/or to the parliament. An essential dimension of, or even precondition for, account-
ability is transparency, because it is necessary for any form of a wider, non-secretive
accountability to be eﬀectively implemented. Thus, in a democracy independence re-
quires accountability, which in turn is preconditioned by policy transparency. As far as
optimal ﬁscal policy or its delegation is concerned, few clear and general results seem
to be supported theoretically or empirically on a broad basis, no matter that a num-
ber of regulations stipulate certain restrictions on ﬁscal discretion. Like in monetary
policy, the trade-oﬀ between value (or moral) judgment and technical (or expert) judg-
ment (involving specialized knowledge) plays a crucial role in delegating ﬁscal policy to
an independent institution. Moreover, if the consequences of ﬁscal policy are long-term
and aﬀect in a similar way the whole society, as it is with stabilization policy, it can
be delegated by analogy to monetary policy (Blinder 1997, 121). Fiscal policy as stabi-
lization policy is characterized by technical knowledge, not so much by moral judgment
as, e.g., redistribution (Calmfors 2003, 334). Therefore, stabilization can be delegated,
whereas all other areas such as redistribution and provision of public goods should not.
1Whose preferences, for simplicity and in the tradition of the political economy literature, we identify
throughout with those of the median voter.
2Most directly Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997, 1998), Dixit and Lambertini (2003), von Hagen and
Mundschenk (2003), Demertzis, Hughes Hallet and Viegi (2004), Wyplosz (2005), Castellani and Debrun
(2005), Mihov and Sibert (2006), Mihailov (2006), Hughes Hallet and Libich (2006), and Ullrich (2007).
3Often in the form of instrument independence under goal dependence, e.g., Fischer (1994) and
Debelle and Fischer (1994), or more speciﬁcally as inﬂation-forecast targeting, e.g., Svensson (1997) and
Herrendorf (1998). This type of monetary regime has been eloquently qualiﬁed by Bernanke and Mishkin
(1997) as ‘constrained discretion’, again in an inﬂation targeting context.4 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
However, the separation of these tasks is not as easy as theoretical models might suggest
because ﬁscal policy touches the core of the political decision process (Buti, Eijﬃnger,
and Franco 2003, 15).
With respect to both monetary and ﬁscal policy considered jointly in their interde-
pendence, major work develops the welfare-theoretic dynamic Ramsey (1927) approach,4
relates to the ﬁscal theory of the price level,5 or derives from the game-theoretic litera-
ture on strategic interaction, e.g., Nordhaus (1994). More recent research along the latter
line has moved into the study of optimal incentive schemes, which could be thought of
as contracts or institutions. Separation and delegation of powers from a principal to an
agent and the related incentive-compatibility design and enforceability with view to some
social optimum have been the key issues of focus. We here contribute further along a
speciﬁc dimension of interest within this particular direction. More precisely, we opt for
a game-theoretic macroeconomic approach since from the perspective of our task it has
two main advantages: (i) it is the traditional one to our topic, dominating the theoretical
studies we quoted and build upon, thus making our results comparable to earlier ones;
and (ii) it allows us to achieve analytical clarity, important in a ﬁrst cut at an issue, such
as ours.6
Our major ﬁndings complement and extend the earlier literature. We compare the
equilibrium outcomes of alternative policy frameworks, representing exogenous social
preferences on institution design, and rank them according to key macroeconomic perfor-
mance criteria such as inﬂation expectations, inﬂation, output and the budget deﬁcit. Our
results demonstrate that accountability does not eliminate the trade-oﬀ between inﬂation
and output stabilization, yet it inﬂuences macroeconomic outcomes toward the prefer-
ences and targets of elected politicians. We conclude that if the priority is to manage
inﬂation and deﬁcit expectations and ﬂuctuations, a society should opt for independent
monetary and ﬁscal policy that is not threatened by the possibility of its decisions being
overridden. If, on the other hand, a society would prefer to mitigate the variability of
output and employment, policymaking by expert committees should be additionally re-
stricted either by accountability mechanisms such as override clauses or similar in eﬀects
or by some form of constrained discretion such as goal dependence.
4E.g., Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari and Kehoe (1999), Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2006),
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004 a, b).
5With Ricardian equivalence, McCallum and Nelson (2006) have claimed that monetary-ﬁscal coor-
dination does not matter at all.
6The alternative of solving a microfounded welfare-theoretic Ramsey-policy problem, along the lines
of Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2006) is inappropriate to address overriding under constrained dis-
cretion following extreme shocks, at the centre of our model, because their linear-quadratic approxi-
mation method applies to small shocks only and under precommitment from a ‘timeless perspective’.
Microfounded but more computationally intensive Ramsey-policy approaches of the kind employed by
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004 a, b) permit more realism (e.g., more distortions and shocks) at the cost
of assuming too that a commitment technology is available and of losing analytical clarity.Independence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 5
The paper is organized as follows. The next section speciﬁes our basic model, deﬁning
precisely the notions of independence and accountability, the mandates of the institutions
responsible for macroeconomic management, and the economic environment. Section 3
discusses our main results, ﬁrst without accountability and then with accountability, and
presents rankings of the policy regimes by alternative performance criteria. Concluding
remarks are oﬀered in section 4. Finally, Appendix A documents the solutions of our
model which arise from the optimization of the relevant authorities under the considered
policy regimes, and Appendix B collects the proofs of all propositions and corollaries.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
2.1 The Target System and Sharing of Power
We set up a model of the relationships among a Government (denoted by a G-superscript),
an MPC (M-superscript) and an FPC (F-superscript).7 The objective functions of the ex-
pert committees reﬂect independence and accountability issues. Independence is granted
with regard to the degree the monetary or ﬁscal authority can choose its own targets and
follow its own preferences. Alternative institution-design regimes between the extremes of
complete freedom of action and full dependence of both authorities are also theoretically
formulated along these lines. Accountability is modeled as the possibility of overriding
committee decisions that would imply costs for the Government speciﬁct oe a c hr e g i m e ,
which deter frequent use of the override option.
Assuming additive separability of a quadratic loss function for each player, rational
expectations and perfect information, as is common in this literature, our point of depar-
ture is the case of ‘joint’ optimization (under full ‘coordination’) with regard to the three
objectives, stabilization of output, inﬂation, and the public-sector budget deﬁcit ratio to





















where y is the real output level, π denotes the inﬂation rate, and d is the primary
government budget deﬁcit (measured as a percentage of GDP); γG
j ,f o rj = y,π,d,a r et h e
7Each of these three policymaking units is considered as a whole, i.e., in its entirety. We, thus, do not
address here aspects of structure and conﬁguration of decision power: neither within the committees,
as much of the literature on MPCs has done, nor within the Government. Moreover, to sharpen the
contrast in incentives vis-à-vis elected politicians, our experts are assumed to enjoy long terms of oﬃce
but to have no reappointment option.
8The usual discount factor parameter β in dynamic models is eliminated from further consideration
in our static framework, as in most of the related studies.6 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
preference ‘weights’9 and an asterisk denotes target levels of the respective variables.10
Benigno and Woodford (2003) have microfounded a similar multiperiod loss function
where the third term above is absent. In their optimization problem, however, the real
primary budget surplus enters via the intertemporal budget constraint of the government.
Wyplosz (2005) has recommended delegating to an FPC decisions on the (primary) budget
balance-to-GDP only, not on its structure, with view to achieving ﬁscal sustainability.
The rationale is that the government intertemporal budget constraint, with constant real
interest rate, r,f o rs i m p l i c i t y ,a n dDt denoting debt-to-GDP in (2) below, can be written
i nt w oe q u i v a l e n tw a y s ,a sat r a n s v e r s a l i t yc o n d i t i o n( T V C )a n da sp r e s e n tv a l u e( P V )o f













gt+j + trt+j − τt+jyt+j
(1 + r)
j :P V . ( 2 )
The variables in the PV representation in (2) deﬁning the deﬁcit — government spend-
ing, gt, (lump-sump) government transfers, trt, and some (distortionary) tax rate,12 τt,
multiplying GDP, yt, all in real terms — have commonly been modeled as instruments of
ﬁscal policy. Usually such modeling has assumed only one of the mentioned ﬁscal instru-
ments to be chosen endogenously by the government under discretion or commitment,
with all the remaining ones taken as exogenously given, e.g., in the neoclassical literature
on optimal ﬁscal policy as well as in its modern microfounded extensions, such as Benigno
and Woodford (2003, 2006) or Benigno and De Paoli (2006).13 In writing our social loss
function in the form (1), we essentially follow Wyplosz’s (2005) interpretation, i.e., one
could think of our deﬁcit target as imposed by the requirement for ﬁscal sustainability
embodied in (2). Because we focus on delegating to an expert committee the stabiliza-
tion role of ﬁscal policy rather than the total of it, abstracting from tax issues and from
t h ec o m p o n e n t so fg o v e r n m e n te x p e n d i t u r e ,w ec o u l di n t e r p r e tv a r i a t i o ni nt h ep r i m a r y
deﬁcit-to-GDP in our set-up as reﬂecting variation in the bulk of government expenditure
9We use quotes because these ‘weights’ in our model context are not necessarily constrained to add
up to unity.
10Conventional macromodels studying monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions, such as Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1997, 1998), von Hagen and Mundschenk (2003) or Castellani and Debrun (2005), have
worked with the same three quadratic terms in the objective function of the policymaker, where govern-
ment spending has usually been included instead of the deﬁcit.
11Ignoring a seigniorage term as appropriate to credible policy, the only case to which we restict
attention here.
12On ﬁrm sales in Benigno and Woodford (2003), on income and/or capital in other papers.
13Other recent microfounded models such as Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Galí and Monacelli (2005),
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) or Adam and Billi (2007) have motivated in diﬀerent ways — e.g., by adding
public spending in consumer utility — a (quadratic) term related to ﬁscal policy in the social objective
function, which we here take for granted since our focus is on a diﬀerent issue, as in the title.Independence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 7
for a given level of taxes (and transfers), and thus inﬂuencing the sustainability of public
debt-to-GDP.
Further formalizing ideas of Blinder (1997) and Wyplosz (2005), we then assume that
the above social objective can be decomposed and its parts appropriately delegated to
an MPC and an FPC, involving some ‘division of policymaking labor’ (Blinder 1997,
124) between these institutions with respect to the primary target of each, inﬂation and
deﬁcit stabilization, respectively, but also complementarity with respect to the secondary
(and shared) target of output stabilization. More precisely, under such separation of
powers our three players are assigned diﬀerent prerogatives and minimize institution-
speciﬁc loss functions. The elected Government minimizes (1) again, but the diﬀerence
now is a constant cost term (see (6) and (8) further down) capturing the fact that the
Government would only be able to ultimately determine economic policy if it overrides
committee decisions. This overriding as a form of accountability comes at some cost
because delegation of economic policy to an independent agency has been made in the
ﬁrst place. Overriding committee decisions would call for a public procedure that results
in costs for the Government because it deviates from its initial delegation decision.14






























We assume that the primary goal for the MPC is to keep inﬂa t i o no nt a r g e t .O u t p u t
stabilization also plays some role but receives a lower weight in the loss function. The
deﬁcit is not a concern for monetary policy. Therefore we have γM
π > γM
y . In a similar
way, the FPC is mostly concerned with having the deﬁcit on target, γF
d > γF
y ;i ta l s o
cares about output, but not about inﬂation. A ﬁnal analogy for the Government requires




d (without being speciﬁca st ow h e t h e rγG
π R γG
d ). In ac-
cordance with the related literature, we endow our expert committees with ‘conservative’
preferences in the sense of Rogoﬀ (1985), i.e., each of them attaches a higher absolute































14We assume that accountability always requires, hence, always implies transparency. Therefore,
and without loss of generality, we ﬁx the degree of transparency to be full, or — which is an alternative
interpretation — any degree necessary to implement eﬃcient monitoring and, thus, enforce accountability.8 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
B u tn o t et h a tt h ej u s t i ﬁcation of ‘conservatism’ in our model is somewhat diﬀerent
from Rogoﬀ’s (1985). First, it is rather the specialized knowledge embodied in the prefer-
ences of the MPC and the FPC that explains it, not the mere preferences. Second, being
non-elected policy institutions consisting of experts, the committees are further assumed
not to have an overambitious output target; they pursue instead a policy that brings
output to its normal (or natural) level, y∗,M = y∗,F = yN.W e t h e n d e n o t e π∗,M = π∗
and d∗,F = d∗ to simplify notation.15 However, the Government has an output target
that is higher than the normal level, reﬂecting what we would call a ‘re-election concern’,
y∗,G >y N. This translates into the inﬂation and budget deﬁcit targets too, π∗,G > π∗
and d∗,G >d ∗.16
2.2 The Monetary Authority
To operationalize independence into a theoretical model,17 we follow the New Keynesian
monetary policy literature in assuming, diﬀerently from the earlier papers we cited, that
the MPC optimizes an objective function with respect to the interest rate. Under partial
independence, it is forced to take the preferences and the targets of the Government into
account, because independence is granted from the Government. This is modeled by a
weighting, 0 ≤ θ
M ≤ 1, applied to the objective functions of the MPC and the Govern-
ment. Such a formulation allows to capture various degrees of instrument (in)dependence








M =0 , the MPC is granted complete (instrument and goal) independence, because
it can determine the interest rate according to its own objective function, that is, without
taking the preferences and targets of the Government into account. If θ
M =1 ,t h eM P C
is instrument- as well as goal-dependent, i.e., operating with no discretion at all and,
eﬀectively, suppressed as an institution.
Unlike independence, accountability is a concept that is not yet clearly deﬁned, es-
pecially in theoretical work. In our context it would require each of the committees to
be responsible for the process and the results of its policy and to be able to explain
15‘Coordination’ only arises in two senses in our model: (i) if the government is in charge of ﬁscal
and monetary policy; (ii) insofar the targets of the two committees are assumed the same while their
preference weights diﬀer, which appears more realistic given the fact that monetary and ﬁscal authorities
communicate and coordinate at an expert level frequently enough.
16Since more output can be attained at the cost of higher inﬂation and deﬁcit-to-GDP, in general as
well as implied by our model economy summarized in (9) below.
17Recall that, in a broader sense, several dimensions of independence could be considered, such as:
(i) goal vs. instrument (operational), (ii) formal (legal, de jure) vs. informal (actual, de facto), (iii)
institutional, (iv) functional, (v) ﬁnancial, (vi) personal, etc.Independence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 9
its actions. Accountability is usually justiﬁed from a democratic point of view and not
because of economic necessity.18 Democratic accountability can take on many diﬀerent
forms.19 In the spirit of Lohmann (1992) and in accordance with the views of Blinder
(1997) concerning delegation, we model accountability as an override clause where the
Government is able to change committee decisions according to its preferences. In case of
overriding MPC’s decision, the Government would step in and put through its preferred
inﬂation rate by setting the nominal interest rate at the required level.20 Therefore, we























where α =1if the MPC is overridden and cannot implement its desired inﬂation
rate. The Government’s preferences and targets now receive a weight in the objective
function that is higher than in the case of independent monetary committee with no
override option for the Government summarized by equation (5). Yet if the MPC is
overridden by the Government, the latter would incur a cost CM.W i t hα =0 ,t h eM P C
can implement its preferred inﬂation rate and will not be held accountable by having its
decisions overridden.
2.3 The Fiscal Authority
The objective function of the FPC resembles that of the MPC, and the degree of inde-
pendence is again captured by a weighting, 0 ≤ θ
F ≤ 1, between the objective function
of the Government and that of the FPC:
18However, if policy targets are communicated to society, as under much greater transparency nowa-
days, accountability will also strengthen the incentives of the implementing authorities to fulﬁlt h e i r
mandate, thus contributing to overall eﬃciency in the macroeconomy.
19Castellani (2002) investigates accountability that is modeled as ex post political intervention, simi-
larly to our approach. Hughes Hallet and Libich (2006, 13-14) deﬁne accountability in an encompassing
way, as the ﬁnal responsibility for the outcomes of monetary policy, and emphasize goal independence
and goal transparency (interpretable as an explicit inﬂation target) as substitute commitment technolo-
gies. Accountability is then modeled as the punishability of the central banker following deviations of
inﬂation from target, in line with a linear contract, as in Svensson (1997), and with the implementation
of inﬂation targeting, e.g., in New Zealand or the UK. In practice, discussion and (implicit) approval of
central bank policy in parliaments have been a wide-spread form of accountability too, more recently
complemented by its explicit evaluation by oﬃcially appointed experts (e.g., in New Zealand in 2001 or
Sweden in 2007).
20”Finally, in a democracy, the central bank’s decisions should be reversible by the political authorities,
but only under extreme circumstances. A Federal Reserve decision on monetary policy can in principle
be overturned by an act of Congress. And Fed governors can be removed from oﬃce for good cause.
These mechanisms have never been used, but America is wise to have them in place. Delegated authority








F =0results in complete (instrument and goal) independence of the FPC,
while θ
F =1yields the opposite extreme with a completely dependent ﬁscal policy. As
with the MPC, the FPC is held accountable by the Government. If the ﬁscal committee
sets the deﬁcit in a way that its actual value deviates to a large extent from the deﬁcit
preferred by the Government, the latter will step in and override the decision of the FPC.























where α =0i ft h ee x p e r tc o m m i t t e ei sl e f tt oc o n d u c tﬁscal policy, and α =1if the
Government overrides FPC’s decision and determines a deﬁcit level according to its own
preferences.
2.4 The Economy and the Conduct of Macroeconomic Policy
T h ee c o n o m yc a nb ed e s c r i b e db ya na g g r e g a t ed e m a n d( A D )a n da na g g r e g a t es u p p l y
(AS) function in a standard way.21 AD, yD in (9), depends on the real interest rate
that is determined by the nominal interest rate, i, the instrument of monetary policy,
and on the instrument of ﬁscal policy, the deﬁcit d. The expected value of the AD i.i.d.
disturbance process, ², is zero and its variance is constant. AS, yS in (9), deviates from
the normal (or natural) output level, yN,i fi n ﬂation, π,a n di n ﬂation expectations, πe,
do not match.22 Again, the expected value of the constant-variance AS i.i.d. disturbance
process, ε, is zero.23 Imposing equilibrium of aggregate demand and supply determines
the output level:
y









21Reminiscent of Sargent and Wallace (1975) and the huge literature they generated.
22The presence of the deﬁcit term in AD but not AS is motivated by our focus on delegating the
stabilization role of ﬁscal policy and is consistent with analogous modeling shortcuts in Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1997, 1998), von Hagen and Mundschenk (2003), and Castellani and Debrun (2005), among
others.
23A positive realization of ε is interpreted as an eﬃciency shock, e.g., better technology, and a negative
realization as a cost-push shock, e.g., higher wages.Independence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 11
with a>0, b>0, c>0.24
Similarly to Lohmann (1992) and Mihov and Sibert (2006), we model the Govern-
ment’s incentives to override endogenously, as described next.
[ Figure 3 about here ]
It is clear that the Government can determine the inﬂation rate, the output gap and
the deﬁcit according to its targets and preferences by minimizing its own loss function.
Any deviation of the instruments from the corresponding optimal levels will result in a
deviation from the desired minimal loss, regardless whether this deviation is positive or
negative because of the quadratic form (see Figure 3). The levels of the variables that are
determined by the committees will result in a higher loss in any case, since the monetary
and ﬁscal policymakers optimize each according to its own loss function (as in Figure
3, again). Therefore, the Government would override the committee decisions in every
event if there are no costs to do so. If there are costs of overriding, the gain of doing
so and choosing the policy instruments according to the Government’s own loss function














F > 0. (10)
Note that each of the arguments in the two loss functions above is endogenous and depends
further on the materialized supply shock ε, given the probability α implied ex ante for
the occurrence of overriding ex post in any particular institution-design framework with
accountability (α 6=0 ). We could have written that as j = j (ε;α) for j = y,π,dunder
the two possibilities captured by the superscripts com (no overriding) and G (overriding)
in (10), which we do not do to keep the notation less complicated. Since among the
deeper determinants of the endogenous arguments of the above loss functions are also
the various target values, in addition to ε and α, and since these constant targets are
not subject to optimization ex post, as assumed, the only magnitude that changes in
every state of nature and inﬂuences the relative loss in (10) is the supply shock ε.T h e
larger its positive or negative realization, the larger the deviation of the macroeconomic
variables determined via the respective instruments by the committees from the level the
Government would have chosen. There would, thus, be a threshold of the supply shock
|ε| where it equates the loss of the Government, LG ¡
yG,πG,d G¢
, including the costs of
overriding, CM + CF, with the loss of the Government conditioned on the decisions of
the committees, LG (ycom,πcom,d com). Any larger shock would lead to a net gain of the
24Which could be themselves deﬁned in terms of underlying deeper parameters that have parallels to
the New Keynesian or Neo-Wicksellian microfounded model for monetary policy analysis, with yN then
interpreted as the ﬂexible-price level of output (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003).12 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
Government when overriding. The probability that such a large supply shock occurs is
given by α and known to the agents when forming their inﬂation expectations.25 With
probability 1−α the supply shock is not large enough to cross the threshold for overriding.












>C M + CF, |ε| > |ε| with prob α
≤ CM + CF, |ε| ≤ |ε| with prob 1 − α
.
T op u ti td i ﬀerently, with accountability as modeled here, the Government would de-
termine the inﬂa t i o nr a t ev i at h ei n t e r e s tr a t ea n dt h ed e ﬁcit with probability α.W i t h
probability 1 − α, the committees decide about the appropriate level of their respective
instruments and, ultimately, determine the inﬂation rate. Private agents will take this
institutional mechanism (captured in our model by the value of the accountability para-
meter α) into account, understanding that the level of macroeconomic variables such as
inﬂation and output can be determined ex post either by the MPC and the FPC or by the
Government, and will form inﬂation expectations accordingly. Inﬂation expectations are,
consequently, a weighted average of the inﬂation rate resulting in circumstances where
the Government ultimately decides (weighted with probability α)a n dt h ei n ﬂation rate in
cases where the committees are left to conduct their preferred monetary and ﬁscal policy
(weighted with probability 1 − α). The probability of overriding and the formation of
inﬂation expectations are exogenously given and cannot be inﬂuenced by policymakers.26
The order of events is assumed to be as follows. The preferences of society/parliament
are exogenously embodied in each particular institution design framework we study, as-
signing accountability to the government (α 6=0in WM and WF) and degrees of indepen-
dence from the government to the MPC (θ
M in ZM)a n dt h eF P C( θ
F in ZF). If there is
goal independence, each expert committee chooses its targets.27 Then, the private sector
forms rational expectations about the inﬂation rate assuming a linear28 feedback rule for
each institution responding to own and other players’ targets, other players’ instruments
and shocks. The supply and demand shocks are realized and observed by the policymak-
ers. The MPC and the FPC set the interest rate and the budget deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio,
respectively, resulting from their optimization. The Government checks whether any
overriding, as part of the accountability mechanism, has to take place. The equilibrium
inﬂation, output and deﬁcit ratio are ﬁnally determined.
25α n e e d st ob eb o u n d e da b o v es u ﬃciently low, e.g., of the order of 0 ≤ α < 0.1 or even less, if
overriding is to occur rarely, so as to ensure credibility of monetary and ﬁscal policy and the underlying
institution-design arrangement.
26Future extensions to less restrictive environments are, of course, contemplated on this aspect.
27We do not model the choice of an optimal target level.
28All policy feedback rules are restricted to be linear here. Nonlinear reaction functions could be a
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3K e y R e s u l t s
The results from solving our model we characterize in the present section concern inﬂation
expectations and the actual levels of inﬂation, output and the budget deﬁcit expressed in
t e r m so ft a r g e tv a l u e sa n ds h o c k s .W ec o n s i d e rd i ﬀerent policy regimes, corresponding to
diﬀerent social preferences on institution design, according to the degree of independence
without or with accountability of the committees (see Table 1 for a listing of the possibil-
ities). To optimally set the instrument levels, i.e., the interest rate and the budget deﬁcit
ratio to GDP, the loss function of the respective policymaker is minimized with respect
t ot h ei n s t r u m e n ta th a n d . T h eG o v e r n m e n tc a nu s et h ei n t e r e s tr a t ea n dt h ed e ﬁcit
jointly, whereas the MPC determines the interest rate taking the deﬁcit as given and the
FPC minimizes its loss via the deﬁcit taking the interest rate as given. It is assumed
that any of the expert committees, when independent, and the Government optimize
simultaneously ex post under perfect information.29
[ Table 1 about here ]
The precise solutions by policy regime and respective variable are provided in Ap-
pendix A. The results show, overall, that the diﬀerent equilibrium values have a similar
structure depending on (a ‘weighted average’ of) target values, gaps between the corre-
sponding inﬂation and output targets of the diﬀerent decision-makers, the normal output
level and the exogenous shocks. The above key terms are ‘weighted’ by expressions that
depend on the parameters of the economy (a, b, c)a n dt h ep r e f e r e n c es t r u c t u r e( γ’s)
of the policymakers. These ‘weights’ play an important role, as they characterize the
diﬀerent possibilities for combining the preferences of the Government, the MPC and the
FPC according to the degree of independence (0 ≤ θ
M ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ θ
F ≤ 1)w i t h o u t
(α =0 ) or with accountability (0 < α < 1) of the committees.
3.1 Delegation of Economic Policy
3.1.1 Without Accountability
Without accountability (α =0 ), the MPC and the FPC can minimize their respective
loss functions, (5) and (7), given the strategy of the other committee. Therefore, they
have to take into account the preferences of the Government to an extent that depends
only on the degree of independence.
In the solution to the general case of the optimization of the MPC’s and the FPC’s
loss functions with partial (0 < θ
M < 1, 0 < θ
F < 1)d e g r e eo fi n d e p e n d e n c e ,Regime A,
29The more complicated cases of sequential optimization and/or imperfect information are left for
future research.14 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
inﬂation and inﬂation expectations diﬀer only because of the supply shock (see Appendix
A). The demand shock is completely oﬀset by monetary policy. Because the committees
and the Government support diﬀerent target values of inﬂation, output and the deﬁcit,
and monetary and ﬁscal policy are not necessarily completely independent, Government
preferences matter and the gaps between the targets inﬂuence the equilibrium levels of
the diﬀerent variables.
There are four interesting limiting cases that arise in a set-up without accountability
(see Table 1). These are a completely (in)dependent monetary and ﬁs c a lp o l i c ya sw e l la s
a completely independent monetary (ﬁscal) and completely dependent ﬁscal (monetary)
policy.
If monetary and ﬁscal policy are completely dependent, θ
M =1and θ
F =1 ,i ti sa s
if the Government determines economic policy according to its own liking (see Appen-
dix A). Insofar existing, the committees only implement the instrument values that the
Government decides. This Regime A1 is therefore, in essence, Government optimiza-
tion. The results show that, whereas the deﬁc i ti so nt a r g e t ,i n ﬂation expectations and,
depending on the shock realization, the inﬂa t i o nr a t ei nm o s tc a s e se n du pa b o v et a r g e t
because of the inﬂationary bias that originates in targeting output above its natural level,
i.e., in the Government’s re-election concern. Again, actual inﬂation and inﬂation expec-
tations diﬀer because of the supply shock that is not completely oﬀset by policymakers.
This yields an output level that deviates from its natural level: upwards if a positive sup-
ply (eﬃciency) shock has materialized, and downwards in the case of a negative supply
(cost-push) shock.
The second limiting case is that of completely independent monetary and ﬁscal poli-
cies, θ
M =0and θ
F =0 .I nt h i sRegime A2, both committees are independent from the
Government to determine the respective instrument level and are ‘not accountable’, in the
sense of our model that their decisions cannot be changed. In this case (see Appendix A),
the deﬁcit reacts to the supply shock and diﬀers from target value. Inﬂation expectations
are on target and diﬀer from inﬂation because of a not fully dampened supply shock.
This leads also to an output level that deviates from the normal one in the direction of
the supply shock.
In Regime A3, monetary policy is assumed to be completely independent from the
Government, whereas the FPC is completely dependent, θ
M =0and θ
F =1 . Because
ﬁscal policy is conducted with regard to Government preferences and targets (see Ap-
pendix A), the deﬁcit explicitly depends on the gaps between the output and inﬂation
targets, where the basic level of the deﬁc i ti sg i v e nb yt h eG o v e r n m e n tt a r g e t .I n ﬂation
expectations are anchored at target value and diﬀer from the inﬂation rate because of the
supply shock. This leads to an output level diﬀerent from the normal level, depending
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If monetary policy is completely dependent on the Government but ﬁscal policy is
completely independent, θ
M =1and θ
F =0 ,w eh a v eRegime A4. Again (see Appendix
A), there is the inﬂuence of the diﬀerence between targets and the not completely oﬀset
supply shock, leading to deviations of output from target via the gap between inﬂation
and inﬂation expectations.
3.1.2 With Accountability
With accountability modeled explicitly (0 < α < 1), there are two possible deﬁcit ratios,
interest rates, inﬂation rates and output levels depending on whether overriding takes
place or not. If no overriding occurs, the monetary and ﬁscal policy committees (hence,
superscript com in the relevant subsections of Appendix A) are left to determine simul-
taneously the inﬂation rate and the output level. If overriding occurs, the Government
(superscript G) steps in and ultimately determines instead the level of the macroeconomic
variables. There is only one level of inﬂation expectations, however, giving each of the
two possibilities for ex post inﬂation a probability of α, respectively 1 − α.I nc o n t r a s t
to the preceding subsection, Government preferences matter in every regime because the
committees can now be overridden even in cases of complete independence, a possibility
that is taken account of in the formation of inﬂation expectations.
The general solution in equilibrium for Regime B yields the deﬁcit, inﬂation expecta-
tions, inﬂation and output if the Government steps in and decides about the instruments
or if the MPC and the FPC are not overridden and conduct policy according to their
preferences. In both cases (see Appendix A), inﬂation expectations are the same because
agents do not know ex ante the size of the supply shock that causes the Government to
override MPC’s and FPC’s decisions ex post. Therefore, agents take both possibilities
into account when forming inﬂation expectations. However, the policymakers optimize
ex post, simultaneously and under perfect information, knowing the size of the supply
shock, so inﬂation, output and the deﬁcit are decided among the authorities in charge.
Regime B230 is characterized by completely independent but accountable commit-
tees, θ
M =0 , θ
F =0 , 0 < α < 1. The structure of the results is the same as if
with partially independent committees (see Appendix A). However, the inﬂuence of the
Government is muted because it aﬀects the results only according to the inﬂation expec-
tations of private agents, and not from the very beginning via the objective functions of
the committees as it would be the case with incomplete independence. In this regime,
the diﬀerence between the respective variables when the Government or the committees
ultimately decide should be larger than under incomplete independence.
30To consider here certain Regime B1, by analogy with Regime A1, would be irrelevant, as the Gov-
ernment cannot be accountable to itself.16 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
If there is an independent but accountable MPC only and ﬁscal policy is completely
dependent on the Government, θ
M =0 , 0 < α < 1 and θ
F =1 ,w ea r ei nRegime B3.
The deﬁcit ratio, the inﬂation rate, inﬂation expectations and output are the same as
in Regime B2 (see Appendix A). What matters is the independence of monetary policy
whereas the (in)dependence of ﬁscal policy does not play a role for the determination of
inﬂation, inﬂation expectations and output. Only the deﬁcit ratio will be determined by
the preferences of the FPC if the committees are left to decide.
An independent but accountable FPC only, θ
F =0 , 0 < α < 1 and θ
M =1 , Regime
B4, yields the same results as Regime A4 if the FPC is left to decide. If the Government
overrides instead, it will implement dG = d∗,G, but inﬂation, inﬂation expectations and
output will be the same as if the committees would determine the instrument levels (see
Appendix A). The particular institutional arrangement being A4 or B4 is, thus, not
crucial for the level of the macroeconomic variables except for the deﬁcit.
3.2 Ranking of the Institution-Design Regimes
We now sum up our key results by ranking the considered institution-design frameworks
according to the corresponding equilibrium outcomes of our model. We discuss alternative
rankings based on a single criterion, and focus on diﬀerent criteria in turn, to highlight
each of the three target variables. To them, we add a fourth criterion, inﬂation expecta-
tions, with which we start here the rankings. The reason is that anchoring private-sector
expectations, although not a target in the explicit loss functions policymakers optimize
upon, is perhaps the most important task of monetary and ﬁscal policy. In the present
section our theoretical ﬁndings are stated compactly in propositions and corollaries with
only brief interpretation oﬀered, while detailed proofs and relevant further intuition are
provided in Appendix B.
3.2.1 By Expected Inﬂation Outcomes
With regard to the ranking of regimes according to inﬂation expectations, we come to
the following conclusions.
Proposition 1 (Anchoring Inﬂation Expectations) Among the institution-design
regimes considered, those with a fully independent non-elected MPC whose decisions are
explicitly guaranteed not to be overridden by elected politicians (Regimes A2 and A3) im-
plement optimal macroeconomic policies with the lowest anchor for inﬂation expectations.
Corollary 1.1 (Anchoring Inﬂation Expectations and FPC) Provided that mon-
etary policy is delegated to a fully independent MPC, delegation or not of ﬁscal policy to
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Corollary 1.2 (Anchoring Inﬂation Expectations and Accountability) All policy
regimes without accountability modeled as an override clause (Regimes A) dominate the
corresponding regimes with accountability (Regimes B) along the dimension of anchoring
inﬂation expectations.
The corresponding ranking of the above regimes along the inﬂation expectations di-
mension is summarized in the middle column of Table 2.
[ Table 2 about here ]
3.2.2 By Actual Inﬂation Outcomes
Realized inﬂation diﬀers from the rationally forecasted one only by a term containing the
ex post supply shock, ε — as the demand shock, ², is completely compensated by policy
(via the optimal interest-rate setting: see Appendix A) in every materialized state of
nature — multiplied by some combination of parameters. We next summarize our results
in terms of deviations π−πe across regimes and rank the latter according to the smallest
(in absolute value) deviation of actual from expected inﬂation.
Proposition 2 (Inﬂation Stabilization) An institution-design regime that implements
optimal macroeconomic policies with the lowest deviation of actual from expected inﬂation
is, again, one with a fully independent MPC.
Corollary 2.1 (Inﬂation Stabilization and FPC) Provided that monetary policy
is delegated to a fully independent MPC, delegation or not of ﬁscal policy to a similarly
independent FPC does not matter for stabilizing ex post deviations of actual from expected
inﬂation, in an analogous way to the ex ante formation of inﬂation expectations.
Corollary 2.2 (Inﬂation Stabilization and Accountability) All policy regimes with-
out accountability modeled as an override clause (Regimes A) also dominate the corre-
sponding regimes with accountability (Regimes B) in terms of resulting in lower deviation
of actual from expected inﬂation.
The ranking according to our second criterion, in fact, a parallel image of the ranking
along the criterion of anchoring inﬂation expectations, is shown in the ﬁnal column of
Table 2. On account of both these criteria, therefore, (i) anchoring inﬂation expectations
(ex ante) and (ii) containing the eﬀects of AS shocks on actual inﬂation (ex post), we
have reached an unambiguous conclusion in terms of (a) the best regime as well as (b)
t h eo r d e r i n go ft h ea l t e r n a t i v ep o l i c yf r a m e w o r k sw ec o n s i d e r e dh e r e .18 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
3.2.3 By Actual Output Outcomes
Besides inﬂation and inﬂation expectations, the output level is another key macroeco-
nomic variable in our model: it is not an instru m e n ti t s e l f ,b u ti st h eo n l ym a g n i t u d et h a t
plays a role in all of the three objective functions. The output levels that arise in the
diﬀerent policy regimes without accountability are all based on the normal output level
and show diﬀerent deviations from this benchmark. In the regimes without accountability
these deviations arise solely because of the supply shock, as the impact of the demand
shock is completely oﬀset by the policymakers. The eﬀect of the supply shock on output
depends on the preferences of the policymakers. In case of a positive (negative) supply
shock, output is higher (lower) than normal. The size of this eﬀect can be ordered as
follows:
Proposition 3 (Output Level and Stabilization without Accountability) Without
accountability, the output level in Regime A1 is equal to the level in Regime A4, and the
output level in Regime A2 is equal to the level in Regime A3. With γM
π /γM





π, as assumed, the output level A1 and A4 is closer to normal output than the
output level A2 and A3. In the general case A, the output level is intermediate between
the polar regimes.
This ranking is the opposite to the one according to actual inﬂation: for output,
the deviation from normal level is highest if monetary policy is independent. If the
Government dominates policymaking, output stabilization is according to its preferences.
Because the MPC gives a higher priority to bringing inﬂation back to target rather than
output compared to the Government, it is not surprising that a supply shock has a larger
impact on the output level if the MPC is independent and can stabilize according to its
own preferences only.
Proposition 4 (Output Level and Stabilization with Accountability) If the Gov-
ernment ultimately determines the instruments in the regimes with accountability, the
output level in Regime B2 equals that of B3. The output level in B4 is lower and closer
to the normal level compared to the output levels in all other regimes. The output level in
B2 and B3 is higher than in B. If the committees are left to decide instead, the net eﬀect
is ambiguous and ranking is not possible.
When the MPC can be made accountable in the sense implied by our model, the
output level is not only inﬂuenced by normal output and the supply shock but also by the
diﬀerence between the Government’s inﬂation target and the MPC’s target as well as by
the gap between the output target of the Government and normal output being the target
of the MPC and the FPC. This result comes from the uncertainty of the private sectorIndependence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 19
which institution would be the policymaker in charge when forming inﬂation expectations.
Unlike in the formation of inﬂation expectations, the probability of overriding does not
play a role in shock stabilization since this task is done after the authority in charge of
economic policy is determined ex post. Moreover, only the independence of the MPC
matters for the output level: the case of a completely independent MPC leads to the
same output level regardless whether the FPC is completely independent or completely
dependent (Regimes B2 and B3).
If the MPC is completely dependent, shock stabilization is determined by the Gov-
ernment only and, therefore, only Government preferences determine the output level
(Regime B4). Output deviates from normal level because of the supply shock. However,
if monetary policy is not completely dependent on Government preferences, the Govern-
ment takes into account the MPC preferences via inﬂation expectations. In this case,
output increases because of the overambitious target levels of the Government, y∗,G >y N
and π∗,G > π∗. The impact of the normal output level on output besides the diﬀerence
to the Government target is positive regardless of the regime with accountability. The
highest output level is reached if the Government overrides the completely independent
MPC (Regimes B2 and B3). Here, agents expect especially low inﬂation and, therefore,
the Government can raise output exceptionally high with lower reaction of the inﬂation
rate than with only partial independence.
Corollary 4.1 (Output Level and Accountability) Comparing the policy regimes
with and without accountability, Regime A1 and A4 produce the same output level as
Regime B4. For all other regimes, the relationship between the output levels is ambigu-
ous.
If monetary policy is completely dependent, only Government preferences determine
output stabilization and output deviates from the normal level only because of supply
shocks. In addition, no target gaps occur, so that without shocks output always equals
its normal level. In this case, there is no diﬀerence between the regimes without and with
accountability (Regimes A1=A4 and B4). This also conﬁrms the presumption that it is
not reasonable to hold a completely dependent authority accountable.
A summary of our results on the ranking of the considered policy regimes according
to actual output is provided in Table 3.
[ Table 3 about here ]
3.2.4 By Actual Deﬁcit Outcomes
Unlike the interest rate, the budget deﬁcit ratio to GDP has a twofold role to play in our
model. First, it is an instrument to stimulate aggregate demand. Second, it is a target20 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
in the loss functions of the Government and the FPC. The starting point in analyzing
the deﬁcit is a deﬁcit target value independent of whether accountability is intended or
not. In cases where ﬁscal policy is dependent, the target equals that of the Government.
With independent ﬁscal policy, the target of the FPC prevails. With intermediate values
of FPC independence, a weighted average of the targets can be observed depending on
t h ed e g r e eo fﬁscal policy autonomy.
Proposition 5 (Deﬁcit-to-GDP Ratio Stabilization) In all regimes where the Gov-
ernment can decide on monetary and ﬁscal policy jointly, the budget deﬁcit will equal the
Government target.
The Government will establish the deﬁc i to nt a r g e ti ft h em o n e t a r ya n dﬁscal au-
thorities are completely dependent and implement policy according to the preferences
of the Government as well as if it overrides committee decisions in the regimes with ac-
countability.31 If both instruments are optimized jointly, then the deﬁcit is not needed to
inﬂuence inﬂation and output: the interest rate is suﬃcient as policy instrument. To get
this result, a dependent ﬁscal policy is not enough; monetary policy has to be dependent
too.
In regimes with accountability, target diﬀerences play a role if the committees are
not overridden and are partially independent (Regimes B) or where monetary policy
is completely independent (Regimes B2 and B3). With independent monetary policy,
the deﬁcit reacts in a stronger way to the target diﬀerences if ﬁscal policy is dependent
on Government preferences. The deﬁcit is then used as an instrument to achieve the
overambitious output target of the Government.
We summarize our ﬁndings on the comparison of regimes along the dimension of the
public deﬁcit in Table 4.
[T a b l e4a b o u th e r e]
3.3 Expectations Anchoring and Shock Stabilization
We now make an attempt to sum up in a compact ﬁnal message our various results
reported in the present section. Insofar this is possible at all — although at the cost of
some minor incompleteness and partial ambiguity — a convenient way seems to be by the
u s eo fac o m p a r a t i v et a b l et h a to ﬀers at a glance the essence of our conclusions. Such is
intended to be Table 5, which lists the considered institution-design regimes in its ﬁrst
column. The ranking of these regimes is then summarized across perhaps the two most
important properties of any macroeconomic stabilization policy: (i) to what extent it
31This becomes clear from the minimization of the Government’s loss ﬁnction (1).Independence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 21
ensures anchoring of (inﬂation) expectations ex ante (the second column of Table 5, in
particular, but also the next two columns); and (ii) to what extent it reacts ex post to
stabilize the eﬀects of macroeconomic shocks, i.e., to ensure lower variability of the target
variables a society has institutionalized in a given regime (the last three columns of Table
5).
[ Table 5 about here ]
Looking ﬁrst across the regimes without accountability in the sense of our model,
i.e., regimes A, it is clear from Table 5 that A2 dominates the other four: it guarantees
the lowest expected inﬂation and the lowest expected budget deﬁcit simultaneously with
expected level of output that equals normal output. Thus, from the perspective of ex ante
anchoring of inﬂation and deﬁcit expectations, i.e., eliminating the inﬂation and deﬁcit
biases, fully independent expert committees would be the preferable institution-design
regime. However, when ex post shock stabilization is instead taken into account, regime
A1 dominates the rest, ensuring the highest stabilization (i.e., the lowest variability) of
output combined with full stabilization (i.e., an achieved target) for the deﬁcit ratio to
GDP; yet this comes at the cost of the lowest inﬂation stabilization (i.e., the highest
inﬂation variability). So the well-known trade-oﬀ from the voluminous literature on
optimal macroeconomic stabilization policies remains unresolved in our model featuring
autonomous decision making by monetary and ﬁscal expert committees.
Adding an override option for the Government as (a modeling shortcut for) some
form of accountability of the committees produces the respective regimes B, but does
not help solve the trade-oﬀ between inﬂation variability and output variability. The B
regimes perform even worse in terms of anchoring inﬂation expectations, at the same time
allowing expectations for output above normal and for a deﬁcit ratio above the target the
ﬁscal experts would have otherwise pursued. In other words, introducing accountability
in the form of an override option for the Government only shifts expectations away from
the targets and preferences of the MPC and the FPC and into the direction of those
of the Government, but does not mitigate the notorious trade-oﬀ. Moreover, in terms
of ex post stabilization of shocks, accountability does not lead to anything better either
relative to the regimes without it.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper addressed the important institution-design issue of independence and ac-
countability of delegated monetary and ﬁscal policy. In a theoretical model allowing for
diﬀerent degrees of autonomy vis-à-vis the government of expert committees to which
society may opt to delegate both monetary and ﬁscal policy, we analyzed the eﬀects of22 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
democratic accountability in the form of possible overriding of committee decisions. As
the literature on monetary policy has usually established, we found that delegation to
autonomous institutions of appointed experts improves the outcomes in terms of average
inﬂation and deﬁcit performance over policies conducted by self-interested politicians. In
other words, independent monetary and ﬁscal authorities operating within clear man-
dates solve the problem of inﬂation and deﬁcit biases by anchoring inﬂation and deﬁcit
expectations at their conservative targets. Moreover, such institutional arrangements also
achieve the strongest stabilization of inﬂation, and often of the deﬁcit ratio, ex post. Yet
greater independence results in increased output variability and, generally, a lower level
of output. Insofar output levels and stabilization ex post would matter instead as a key
criterion, our ranking of the policy regimes studied is reversed. Because the government,
aiming at re-election, is more concerned about meeting the output target, the highest
output stabilization, and in most cases also actual output level, arises if its preferences
alone count in decision-making: either when monetary policy is completely dependent, or
when the government overrides the MPC. Imposing to the committees accountability for
their actions in the form of possible overriding does not eliminate the trade-oﬀ between
inﬂation and output stabilization (and, usually, levels). Accountability only inﬂuences, or
shifts, macroeconomic outcomes toward the preferences and targets of elected politicians.
Overall, applying any combination of the above considerations as a multiple criterion
to rank the examined institution-design frameworks may give priority to either anchoring
inﬂation and deﬁcit expectations ex ante, and hence also stabilizing ex post inﬂation, or
to output stabilization, possibly constrained by attaining the target for the public-sector
deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio too. This is, certainly, a political trade-oﬀ, and any solution to it
would be chosen in each relevant real-world context with view to the preferences of so-
ciety and its democratic representatives, as well as the economic environment and the
institutional framework for policymaking. What we can conclude from our theoretical
exercise is that if the priority is to manage inﬂation and deﬁcit expectations as well as
actual inﬂation, a society should opt for independent monetary and ﬁscal policy which
is free from the threat of its decisions being overridden. If, on the other hand, a society
would prefer to mitigate the ﬂuctuations of output and employment, policymaking by
expert committees should be constrained either by limits to independence, e.g., permit-
ting instrument- but not goal-independence, as in popular inﬂation targeting regimes of
monetary policy, or by accountability mechanisms such as override clauses or more so-
phisticated contractual arrangements with broadly similar eﬀects. A combination of both
these restrictive institutional devices, one acting upon the degree of independence and the
other upon the form of accountability, is also envisageable — as well as any intermediate
policy regimes between the polar cases — depending on the priorities and corresponding
trade-oﬀs a democratic society is prepared to accept and implement.Independence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 23
AM o d e l S o l u t i o n

































y > 0, ϕ ≡ γM
π + c2γM












π > 0, φ ≡ γG
d + a2γF
y > 0,




c2ω > 0 if 0 < α < κΠ
(1−θM)c2ω.
We derive32 the following expressions for the optimized policy instruments,t h ei n t e r e s t
rate and the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio, and the resulting equilibrium macroeconomic outcomes,
in terms of the actual inﬂation rate, inﬂation expectations and the actual output level.
A.1 Delegation of Economic Policy without Accountability



























































































































































































32With the help of Maple.24 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
A.1.2 Special-Case Solutions: Regimes A1, A2, A3, A4
Regime A1: Government Optimization without Accountability





















d = d∗,G, (A-7)

























Regime A2: Completely Independent Committees



























πe = π∗, (A-14)





Regime A3: Completely Independent MPC with Completely Dependent FPC













































π, πe and y are the same as in Regime A2.
Regime A4: Completely Independent FPC with Completely Dependent MPC




























ε. (A-19)Independence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 25
π, πe and y are the same as in Regime A1.
A.2 Delegation of Economic Policy with Accountability
A.2.1 General-Case Solution with Partial Independence: Regime B





































































































dG = d∗,G, (A-21)












































































































































































































































































































































































πe the same as if the Government overrides ,











































































A.2.2 Special-Case Solutions: Regimes B2, B3, B4
Regime B2: Independent but Accountable Committees If the Government over-



































































dG = d∗,G, (A-30)
πe =
(1 − α)κγM
π π∗ + αϕγG
π π∗,G
γM










π κ − αc2ω
, (A-31)


























(1 − α)(b + c)γM
y κ
γM
π κ − αc2ω
yN, (A-32)























































































































πe the same as if the Government overrides ,




















(1 − α)(b + c)γM
y κ
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(A-37)28 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
Regime B3: Independent but Accountable MPC with Completely Dependent
FPC If the Government overrides the decision of the MPC,a l lﬁve variables of interest






































π κ +( 1− α)bcγG























































and π, πe and y are the same as in Regime B2.
Regime B4: Independent but Accountable FPC with Completely Dependent
MPC If the Government overrides the decision of the FPC,i tw i l li m p l e m e n tdG = d∗,G
and iG equal to that in Regime A1, but π, πe and y are the same as if the FPC would
determine its instrument level.Independence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 29
B Proofs of the Propositions
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollaries 1.1 and 1.2
A. Without Accountability We start by comparing the identiﬁed four special-case
regimes without accountability (A1, A2, A3 and A4) in terms of the lowest expected
inﬂation. We show below that Regimes A2 and A3 perform best along this particular







This is true no matter whether the FPC is also fully independent (as in Regime A2) or
not (as in Regime A3).














Insofar we allow for a re-election concern of the Government, y∗,G −yN > 0, in line with
the tradition of the literature on time inconsistency, A1 and, identically, A4, produces a
substantial inﬂationary bias, which is a standard result. The expected inﬂation is higher,
i.e., the inﬂationary bias is stronger, the higher is the Government’s weight on output
relative to that on inﬂation, γG
y /γG
π > 1, and the stronger is the reaction of aggregate
supply to surprise inﬂation, captured by c>0. In fact, an elastic AS response to forecast
errors in expectations, i.e., a steeper (short-run) Phillips curve slope, c>1,m a g n i ﬁes
the eﬀect of any given measure, y∗,G − yN > 0, of the re-election concern on inﬂation
expectations, while an inelastic AS response, i.e., a ﬂatter (short-run) Phillips curve slope,
dampens it.33 Only if the Government is not pursuing an overambitious output target,
y∗,G − yN =0 ,i n ﬂation would be π∗ = π∗,G = πe,a si nR e g i m e sA 2a n dA 3 .
Consider next the case when θ




























Insofar the re-election concern exists, we still have an inﬂationary bias relative to the
cases of fully independent MPC (A2 and A3). Yet now the expected inﬂation outcome is
33There is no theoretical or empirical reason to restrict our parameter c to a particular positive-valued
range (Woodford 2003, p. 245). Earlier aggregative models have AS or Phillips curve relations where
the analogous parameter to c here is not restricted more than just being a positive number too (Sargent
and Wallace 1975, p. 242).30 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
lower than the one under fully dependent monetary policy (A1 and A4), because of two
reasons. First, the multiplier to the output target gap is now smaller relative to the latter









π, that is, because the preference weight of
the monetary policymaker, γM
π , now plays a role in reducing the response of private-sector








of the overambitious Government’s target for inﬂation, π∗,G, now forms the expected level
of inﬂation, together with a smaller (assuming 0 < γG
π < γM








< 1,o ft h eM P C ’ sl o w e ri n ﬂation target, π∗, consistent with attaining
normal output level on average.



























it naturally splits into two regions. To see this, set θ







] and, thus, becomes the average preference weight on inﬂation for the
Government and the monetary committee. Then (i) if 0 < θ
M < 1/2 so that the MPC
opinion matters more than that of the Government in deciding on targets and preferences
with respect to inﬂa t i o n( a n do u t p u t ) ,π∗,G and y∗,G − yN will be weighted less and π∗
more so that the re-election concern will be less important in expectation formation.
Therefore, general case A (i) will be ranked between A2=A3 and the case of θ
M =1 /2.
By contrast, and following analogous reasoning, general case A (ii), where 1/2 < θ
M < 1,
will come in this ranking between the case of θ
M =1 /2 and A1=A4. The ranking we
just derived is reﬂected in the top half (Regimes A) of the middle column of Table 2.
B. With Accountability Since expected inﬂation in Regime B4 is exactly the same
as in Regimes A1 and A4, we turn to the two cases where the MPC is independent
but now accountable, Regimes B2 and B3, in the sense of facing a possibility that its
optimal decisions are overridden by the Government. Logically, this adds a constraint
in the optimization of the MPC and inﬂuences it away from its priority on inﬂation
expectations and more into stabilization considerations concerning actual output. This
results in expectations formation that is less favorable than our best regimes on this




























































∗,G.Independence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 31
The four coeﬃcients above have a common denominator. Take ﬁrst ‘fair odds’ of























































































∗,G,w h e r e :
























Comparing the coeﬃcients above with the simple expression for the corresponding
regimes without accountability, πe
A2,A3 = π∗, we can conclude that Regime A2=A3 domi-
nates Regime B2=B3 for α =1 /2 in terms of anchoring inﬂation expectations to a lower
level. First, the coeﬃcients on π∗ and π∗,G above are both between 0 and 1, implying some
sort of weighting of the inﬂation targets of the MPC and the Government, with π∗ < π∗,G,













Second, insofar y∗,G >y N and because the positive coeﬃcient on the Government’s
output target dominates in absolute value the negative coeﬃcient on the MPC’s target
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because another positive constant is added on top of the weighted inﬂation targets
just discussed determining πe
B2,B3,α=1/2.
For the more general case of 0 < α < 1/2 (small(er) probability of overriding),
t h ew e i g h to nt h eM P C ’ si n ﬂation target would be higher than in the special case of
α =1 /2 relative to that of the Government’s inﬂation target; and the weight on the
Government’s overambitious output target relative to normal output would be lower.
Hence, on both counts, inﬂation expectations would be even lower than under α =1 /2.
Conversely, for the more general case of 1/2 < α < 1 (high(er) probability of overriding),
the weight on the MPC’s inﬂation target would be lower than in the special case of
α =1 /2 relative to that of the Government’s inﬂation target; and the weight on the
Government’s overambitious output target relative to normal output would be higher.
Hence, on both counts, inﬂation expectations would be higher than under α =1 /2.32 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
Thus, being a ‘weighted average’ of Government’s and MPC’s targets, not just for
α =1 /2 but also for any general probability of overriding 0 < α < 1 as we showed above,
expected inﬂation is higher with accountability in B2 and B3 than it is in the parallel
cases with a fully independent MPC in A2 and A3. That is, Regime A2=A3 dominates
Regime B2=B3 in terms of anchoring private-sector expectations. For the same reason
and following analogous logic, Regime A dominates Regime B in terms of expectation
formation. This completes our proof of Proposition 1 and corollaries 1.1 and 1.2.¥
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2
A. Without Accountability Our extremes are, again, completely independent expert
committees (Regime A2) versus a Government that optimizes alone (Regime A1). In












¢ε, so that 0 < |Coeﬀ.o fεA2,A3| < 1.
I nt h ec a s ew h e nc ≥ 1 the inequality above is obvious. In the case when 0 <c<1





































y > 1 in the beginning.
Hence, the eﬀect of the materialized AS disturbance, ε,o na c t u a li n ﬂation and on the
forecast error is dampened, the more so the higher is the MPC’s preference weight on
inﬂation, γM
π , and the more sensitive is aggregate supply to surprise inﬂation, i.e., the
larger c.












¢ε, so that, again, 0 < |Coeﬀ.o fεA1,A4| < 1.Independence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 33
Similarly, in the case when c ≥ 1 the inequality above is obvious. In the case when



































so that we may have a dampening eﬀect provided the above inequality holds, or now
a l s oam a g n i f y i n ge ﬀect, if alternatively the above inequality does not hold. The case of
the magnifying eﬀect is not relevant to our comparison across regimes here of ex post





y ,t h ed a m p e n i n ge ﬀect is stronger on both counts in Regime A2 relative to
Regime A1. Note that, again, Regime A2 is equivalent to Regime A3, and Regime A1 to
A4 if the criterion for ranking is, like in the present subsection, the deviation of actual
from expected inﬂation.
B. With Accountability Now the ranking is less evident, but we can show the fol-











B2). There are three pairs of terms in the respec-
tive expressions for πG
B2 and πcom















y in the 2nd term of π
G
B2 < κ − αc
2γ
G







y in the 4th term of π
G
B2 > θ
Mκ in the 4th term of π
com
B2 .
The ﬁrst pair of terms multiply the supply shock, ε; the second pair multiply the
inﬂation target gap, π∗ − π∗,G < 0; and the third pair of terms multiply the output
target gap, y∗,G −yN > 0. In addition to a larger multiple to the supply shock, a smaller
multiple to a negative term, and a greater multiple to a positive term in the respective34 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
(G versus com)a c t u a li n ﬂation expressions (with the remaining terms in them being the















i.e., B2com results in smaller deviations of actual from expected inﬂation relative to
B2G.
We next argue that A2, in turn, results in even smaller deviations of actual from
expected inﬂation relative to B2com, because: (i) πcom
B2 is some weighted average of π∗ and
π∗,G; (ii) the supply shock multiplier in πcom
B2 is bigger than that in πA2; and (iii) there
are, furthermore, two positive terms added in πcom
B2 which are absent in πA2.
So, A2<B2com<B2G or A2<B2, i.e., Regime A2 leads to a smaller deviation of actual
inﬂation from target relative to the corresponding Regime B2.
Similarly to the logic we exposed above, one can then also show that the remaining
Regimes B, with accountability, are dominated by the respective Regimes A, without
accountability, along the dimension of producing the lowest deviation of actual from
expected inﬂation. Hence, the best regime in terms of containing inﬂation following a
cost-push (i.e., negative supply) shock is to design the MPC fully independent. This
completes our proof of Proposition 2 and corollaries 2.1 and 2.2.¥
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
(Without Accountability) It is straightforward to establish the result in this proposi-
tion by concentrating on the coeﬃcient of the supply shock term in the output equations,
because this shock is the only source that drives output away from normal in all regimes:


















π > Π > γG
π, the ranking is now reversed relative to the case of actual inﬂation.
In the general case of Regime A, shock stabilization is a ‘weighted average’ of the pref-
erences of the Government and the MPC, where the weight is according to the degree of
independence of the MPC. In this case, an intermediate level of shock stabilization arises.
T h i sc o m p l e t e so u rp r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . ¥Independence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 35
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4 and Corollary 4.1
Proof of Proposition 4 (With Accountability) Again, normal output is the start-
ing point for actual output. However, there is an additional eﬀect of the normal output
l e v e lo na c t u a lo u t p u tt h a ti n c r e a s e si t si m p a c ta b o v eu n i t y . T h es i z eo ft h i se ﬀect de-
pends on the probability of overriding and on the preferences of the Government and the
M P Cw i t hr e g a r dt oi n ﬂation and the output gap.
If the committees are left to determine the instrument level under accountability,
the results have the same structure as in the regimes where the Government steps in.
However, the eﬀects of the gap between the inﬂation targets of the Government and the
committees and the gap between the output target of the Government and normal output
have the opposite sign. The committees determine the instrument level in a way that
these gaps now have a negative inﬂuence on the output level. The respective impact
coeﬃcients are of the same magnitude as when the Government overrides the committees
but weighted with the probability that the Government does not step in, 1 − α,i n s t e a d
of α. The impact coeﬃcient of the normal output level besides that of the diﬀerence
to the Government target is of the same size and magnitude as in the case where the
Government ﬁnally decides. Moreover, the impact coeﬃcient of the supply shock is
higher if the committees are not overridden because they have a lower preference for
output stabilization. If the committees decide, output would be lower as a rule compared
to Government decisions. However, there is a range for positive supply shocks where
ycom >y G and for
ε >
γM


















in the general case.
Illustration of Proposition 4 Figure 4 shows the basic mechanism that leads to
this result and that also applies to all other comparisons of output outcomes when the
committees are involved.
[Figure 4 about here]
The starting point is the normal output level multiplied with a term that is higher
than one. Because the weighting of normal output is the same regardless whether the
G o v e r n m e n to rt h ec o m m i t t e e sd e c i d e ,w eo b s e r v et h es a m ed e v i a t i o nf r o mt h a tl e v e l .
A further deviation occurs, ﬁrst, due to the impact of the supply shock that is partly
accommodated by the policymaker in charge. Because the Government has higher pref-
erences for output on target, the deviation from normal output is lower with Government
overriding; this leads to a higher Government output level in case of a negative, and
a lower level in case of a positive, supply shock compared to the respective committee36 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
levels. Second, the target diﬀerences are still another source of deviation from normal
output, but in an unambiguous way: output with the Government in charge is always
higher than if committees are left to decide policies. However, there is a range where
the Government level of output is lower than the committee level because of the stronger
output stabilization by the former relative to the latter.34 This completes our proof of
Proposition 4.¥
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y4 . 1 For output stabilization across responsibilities and account-
ability regimes, the following results can be established:
0 < Coeﬀ.o fεA1,A4,B4 = Coeﬀ.o fε
G


















π , the highest degree of output stabilization is achieved if the Government
is in charge of monetary policy. This can be the case without accountability when the
committees are completely dependent (Regimes A1=A4(=B4)), and with accountability
when the Government overrides (Regimes B2, B3). In each case, shock stabilization oc-
curs with regard to Government preferences only. For shock stabilization, accountability
does not matter because the policymakers decide about stabilization if they have the
power to do so and private agents do not expect shocks on average. Therefore, only own
preferences play any role.
Because target diﬀerences only occur in regimes with accountability, output is higher
(lower) compared to regimes without accountability if the Government (the committees)
is (are) in charge and if monetary policy is not completely dependent. Because target
diﬀerences between the Government and the committees are negative in cases where the
committees decide, the net eﬀect is not clear since such diﬀerences point in the opposite
direction compared to the positive eﬀect of the normal output level. If the Government is
in charge, the net eﬀect is unambiguously positive, when putting aside the supply shock.
This completes our proof of Corollary 4.1.¥
34The unambiguous ranking of actual inﬂation outcomes across regimes arises because deviations
from expected inﬂation are considered that result only due to the supply shock. If absolute levels of
inﬂation rates are compared instead, a similar ambiguity as in the case of output levels arises and target
diﬀerences play a role in addition to the supply shock as discussed next. A comparison of the inﬂation
rate determined by the Government with the one determined by the committees in Regime B with
accountability shows that there is a realization of the supply shock where the inﬂation rates are equal.
The shock is of the same size as the one that equates the output levels, yG and ycom in Regime B (see
equation (A-40)).Independence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 37
B.5 Proof of Proposition 5
A. Without Accountability If no accountability of the committees is intended, the
deﬁcit reacts not only to the target level but decreases (increases) with positive (negative)
supply shocks. Ranking the regimes without accountability according to the reaction to
supply shocks, Regime A1 does not show any inﬂuence of supply shocks. In Regime A2,
the inﬂuence of the supply shock is larger than in Regime A4. A ranking of the other
regimes according to the shock is not possible. The reaction of the deﬁcit to supply
shocks in regimes with accountability is the same as in the respective A regimes if the
committees are left to decide. If the Government overrides, there is no inﬂuence of the
shock. The relation between the inﬂuence of the supply shock on the deﬁcit level in



























































In addition to supply shocks, the deﬁcit reacts to the diﬀerence between the inﬂa-
tion and output targets of the committees and the Government if monetary policy is
completely independent but ﬁscal policy is not (Regime A3) and if both committees are
partially independent (Regimes A). In these cases, the Government tries to oﬀset some
inﬂuence of the independent determination of the interest rate. If monetary policy is
completely dependent but ﬁscal policy independent, such eﬀects do not occur.
B. With Accountability If the Government decides alone, the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio is
always on target and not needed for stabilization purposes or aiming at target levels for
inﬂation and output. A ranking of the deﬁcit when the committees are not overridden by
the Government looks as follows. In Regime B1 with completely dependent committees,
the deﬁcit is on target. If the FPC is made independent, it also reacts to shocks but
introduces a lower target level. If the MPC is made completely independent, there is also
a reaction to the target diﬀerences that is more aggressive (stronger) with a dependent
FPC. But the reaction to shocks cannot be compared between the two regimes with
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Figure 1: Standardized unemployment rate (blue curves) and CPI inﬂa t i o n( r e dc u r v e s ) ,% ,
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Figure 2: Cyclically adjusted general government budget balance, % of potential GDP, annual
data, OECD, Economic Outlook, May 200740 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
yG-yG*
1. Under Govt optimization
instruments are chosen
so as to minimize Govt loss
ycom-yG*
2. Under committee optimization
output is always less than
under Govt optimization
3. Hence, with e= 0, actual values of target variables in Govt loss function always lead
to higher loss for Govt under committee optimization relative to Govt optimization 
Without supply shock
(the same picture arises for the inflation rate) LG(y)
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Figure 3: Ex ante relative loss in terms of output with accountability
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Figure 4: Eﬀects of policy decisions on the output level when the Government decides and
when the committees decide in the general case with accountabilityIndependence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 41





0 < α < 1
General Case: Partial Independence 0 < θM < 1,
0 < θF < 1
Regime A Regime B
Special Cases:
Government Optimization θM =1 , θF =1 Regime A1 irrelevant case
Independent Committees θM =0 , θF =0 Regime A2 Regime B2
Independent MPC, Dependent FPC θM =0 , θF =1 Regime A3 Regime B3
Independent FPC, Dependent MPC θM =1 , θF =0 Regime A4 Regime B4
Table 1: Overview of the studied policy regimes depending on the degree of independence and
accountability of the committees
Regime πe (rank) π − πe (rank)
A
2, if 0 < θ
M < 1
2;
or 3 if 1
2 < θ
M < 1
2, if 0 < θ
M < 1
2;







B dominated by A dominated by B2=B3
B2 dominated by A2 dominated by A2=A3
B2G — =B3G dominated by B2com=B3com
B2com — =B3com dominated by A2=A3
B3 dominated by A3 =B2, dominated by A3=A2
B4 4 dominated by B2=B3
Table 2: Ranking of the policy regimes by inﬂation outcomes (1 - closest to target value, 4 -
largest deviation from target value)42 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
Regime AS shock stabilization Target diﬀerences Normal output level
(rank) π∗,G − π∗ > 0, y∗,G − y∗ > 0 yN
sign size (absolute value) (normalized to 1)
A 2 (intermediate) - =1
A1 1 (highest) - =1
A2 3( l o w e s t ) - =1
A3 =A2 - =1
A4 =A1 - =1
BG =A1 > 0 BG <B2G B2G >BG > 1
Bcom =A < 0 Bcom <B2com =Bcom > 1
B2G =A1 > 0 B2G > 1
B2com =A2 < 0 =B2com > 1
B2G ≥ (≤)B2com
if α ≤ (≥)1
2
B3G =A1 > 0= B2G =B2G
B3com =A2 < 0= B2com =B2com
B4G =A1 -- =A1=1
B4com =A1 -- =A1=1
Table 3: Ranking of the policy regimes by output outcomes
Regime AS shock stabilization Target diﬀerences Target level
(rank) π∗,G − π∗ > 0, y∗,G − y∗ > 0
A ? A<A3 A2<A<A1
A1 1( f u l l ) - A1>A2
A2 2( l o w e r ) - A1>A2
A3 ? A<A3 =A1
A4 3( h i g h e r ) - =A2
BG =A1 - =A1
Bcom =A >0 =A
B2G =A1 - =A1
B2com =A2 B2<B3 =A2
B3G =A1 - =A1
B3com =A3 B2<B3 =A3
B4G =A1 - =A1
B4com =A4 - =A4
Table 4: Ranking of the policy regimes by deﬁcit outcomesIndependence and Accountability of MPC and FPC 43
Regime Expectations anchoring (ex ante) AS shock stabilization (ex post)
πe ye de π − πe y − ye d − d
e
A intermediate yN intermediate intermediate intermediate intermediate






κ ε highest 0ε full











































κ ε highest 0ε full
Bcom dominated by A >y N >d
∗ intermediate intermediate intermediate







κ ε highest 0ε full





















κ ε highest 0ε full


















κ ε highest 0ε full














Table 5: Summary ranking of the policy regimes44 Mihailov and Ullrich (September 2008)
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